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Abstract
Online social networks (OSNs) are one of the most popular web-based
services for people to communicate and share information with each other.
With all their benets, OSNs might raise serious problems in what concerns
users’ privacy. One privacy risk is caused by accessing and sharing co-owned
data items, i.e., when a user posts a data item that involves other users, some
users’ privacy may be disclosed, since users generally have dierent privacy
preferences regarding who can access and share their data. Another risk is
caused by the privacy settings oered by OSNs that do not, in general, al-
low ne-grained enforcement, especially in cases where posted data items
concern other users. We discuss and give examples of these issues, in order
to illustrate their impacts on current OSNs’ privacy protection mechanisms.
We propose a collaborative access control framework to deal with such pri-
vacy issues. Basically, in our framework, the decision whether a user can
access or share a co-owned data item is based on the aggregated opinion of
all users involved. Our solution is based on the sensitivity level of users with
respect to the concerned data item, the trust among users, the types of con-
trollers (those who are concerned in making the collaborative decision) and
the types of accessors (those who are identied to access a given data item
or not). In order to observe how varying some of the parameters mentioned
above inuence the outcome of the permitting/denying decision of the pro-
posed solution, we provide an evaluation of our framework. We also present
a proof-of-concept implementation of our approach in the open source OSN
Diaspora.
Keywords: Collaborative Access Control, Multiparty, Privacy, Online Social
Networks
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Introduction
1 Privacy
Although there is a prevailing belief that privacy is quite a new concept, de-
veloped with the capability of new web-services technologies, this view is
not quite precise. During the early time of the industrial revolution, ocials
perceived privacy as a default regulation of human life. The right of privacy
that emerged during the Gilded Age (1840-1950), was formed into a constitu-
tional creed by 1965, which considered the oldest constitutional rights. War-
ren and Brandeis dene privacy as the "right to be let alone" [60]. Decades
later, Westin referred to it as "the clime of individuals, groups, or institu-
tions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent informa-
tion about them is communicated to others." [61]. Because of the importance
of privacy for an individual’s autonomy, identity, and integrity many have
attempted to dene privacy [3, 61]. However, the criticism on the complexity
and ambiguity of such denitions is still quite prevalent [57].
Privacy is recognized as a human right by many international and re-
gional agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [5,
40]. Privacy is closely related to other fundamental human rights such as
dignity, personal autonomy or self-determination, freedom, individuality, re-
spect, etc. This gives privacy paramount importance.
In the twenty-rst century, technological change has apparently shaken
up society and privacy along with it; thus, theories and models have been
developed to achieve and meet the demands of this change. Information pri-
vacy has rstly and clearly been realized as an issue when the internet was
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entirely commercialized in the United States [21]. Hence, the Data Protection
Directive of the European Union has dened information privacy explicitly
as a basic human right [24].
Given the dramatic improvements in information technologies (e.g., Big
Data, digital identity, biometrics and online social networks) in the last decade,
and the increasing processing and storing capacity of computer devices, tech-
nology has become pervasive in our daily activities. A massive amount of
information is thus available over those technologies, making privacy par-
ticularly important in the socio-technical landscape. The proliferation of on-
line data collected in everyday life has a destructive eect on privacy due to
the sensitivity of the data collected and shared without convenient control
or monitoring.
Online services, such as online social networks, provide immense benet
for the entire society. However, they have also created lots of unanticipated
privacy breaches that compromise individual privacy. In the following sec-
tion, we briey explain the structure of online social networks and its possi-
ble privacy breaches.
2 Online Social Networks
With the increasing popularity of the World Wide Web (WWW), many dif-
ferent web-based services become available, including online social networks
(OSNs). OSNs promote online social interactions between individuals, for in-
stance making a relationship, meeting others and sharing information [36].
As reported by Boyd and Ellison [10], OSNs are distinguished from other
web-based services by three characteristics: rst, they have a public or semi-
public prole, which is a web-page that describes the user by information
such as age, location or interests among others; second, the prole contains a
set of connections or relationships between users might be established based
on suggestion from the OSN, relying on the public’s personal information
such as name, location, birthday, personal interests, etc. to structure them.
Third, OSNs provide users with the ability to share and view certain infor-
mation (e.g., photos, contacts, interests, activities, backgrounds, etc.) about
others they are linked to.
Since their introduction, OSNs like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and
LinkedIn have attracted over two billion users, who are uploading and shar-
ing hundreds of billions of data items through them. And as they are getting
further integrated in the daily life of many more people, the number of users
and amount of data they would be uploading and sharing are expected to
continue growing in the coming years.
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Figure 1: Social Graph Example
Given the inherent structure of OSNs, the most common way to represent
OSNs are graphs (usually called social graphs in this context) [11]. Vertices
in the graph, represent users and resources (e.g., pictures, posts, etc.) and
edges of the graph are utilized to model the relationships among users and
resources.
Figure 1 shows an example of such graph. In this example, there are three
users: Alice, Bob and Carol and one resource, a picture, indicated as Pic. Dot-
ted arrows represent social relationships between users, while plain arrows
are relationships between users and resources. The family relationship be-
tween Alice and Bob is a bidirectional relation (symmetric), as in Facebook.
On the other hand, follow is a unidirectional relation (asymmetric) which
means that a user can follow others without being followed. Additionally,
the plain arrows indicate the connections between users and the resource
Pic. The connection between Alice and Pic denotes that Alice is the owner
of the picture, while Bob is tagged in it.
2.1 Privacy Policies in Online Social Networks
Privacy settings from which hereafter we will refer to as privacy policies, in
today OSNs allow users to set who can access what information. In most
existing OSNs, users are provided with a large variety of relationships that
they use to create their own social circles, e.g., family, friends, colleagues,
hiking group, acquaintances and so forth. The current privacy policies in
OSNs are specied in terms of relationships. Typically, granting access to a
data item is subject to the type of the relationship or its composition (e.g.,
friends, friends-of-friends). Moreover, privacy policies depend on the func-
tionality and purpose of the OSN platform. For instance, in privacy policies
3
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of Facebook, users can determine who can access their posts or friends lists
and also, determine the actions that other users can perform. For example,
users can dene the social circle extent (e.g., friends-of-friends or everyone)
of users who are able to send them a friendship request. Other OSNs, like
Twitter, are very liberal with what they share to your news feed. Twitter
users are able to choose whether to allow the general public to view their
Tweets or to make them viewable only to people whom they approve to
follow them. In private mode, users avoid having their Tweets viewed by
anyone, and those Tweets will be out of any search engines such as Google.
Unlike other OSNs, LinkedIn is based on full access and eortless disclosure
of users professional and relevant information such as where they live, tele-
phone numbers, occupations, professional connections and education. The
prole acts as an online resume. However, since many users have privacy
concerns, LinkedIn helps users to manage their privacy. A user can specify
who can see her connections list, and controls whether or not other users can
see if the user has viewed their proles. Unlike other networks, LinkedIn
allows users to control who can see their prole photos. For instance, "My
Connections" means the prole photo will be seen by connection list only,
while the "Network" option means that the user prole picture can be viewed
by second and third level connections. Finally, in all OSNs, users can block
other users. Blocking a user means she virtually does not exist anymore and
prevents any interaction between the two users, hence excluding any abusive
or harmful behaviour.
Although privacy policies enable users to protect their personal infor-
mation from other users within the network, they are notoriously dicult
to congure correctly and do not easily match the OSN’s users sharing in-
tentions [2, 4, 20, 38, 45, 46, 47, 48]. Madden conducted a study where she
found 48% of OSN users report struggles in managing their OSN privacy set-
tings [46]. Another study reveals that only 37% of Facebook’s users consider
that privacy settings match their expectations [45]. Due to this lack of under-
standing and management diculties, some users leave their privacy settings
to the default, which mostly provides insucient protection, allowing their
data be exposed to strangers [27, 43].
Although OSN companies are putting eort into improving privacy poli-
cies for their users, there are still many privacy risks for their users that
are caused by limitations in their current privacy protection mechanisms
[14, 52]. The research community has identied a number of desirable fea-
tures, that are considered to be requirements, in order to enhance privacy in
OSNs [31, 66]. Privacy policies should be:
• Understandable and User-friendly: OSN’s users on average do not have
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expertise in choosing the proper privacy policies that can protect their
information from undesired disclosure [49]. Users require privacy mech-
anisms that are easily understandable and manageable, and user friendly
interfaces that help them to reduce the burden of setting their privacy
policies.
• Interoperable: Usually, users have accounts on dierent OSNs such as
Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, etc. since each OSN has a specic ob-
jective. For example, the purpose of Facebook is to facilitate users’ con-
tact in their social relationships, while LinkedIn allows users to main-
tain their professional network. Thus, it would be desirable for the
privacy mechanisms and policies to be interoperable to protect cross-
border data ows between OSNs.
• Sticky: Users’ data can span several organizations, applications and lo-
cations. Therefore, policies have to be sticky which means they should
follow the piece of data to describe how it can be used after access to
it has been granted.
• Fine-grained: Providing ne-grained privacy policies will make it eas-
ier for users to express their privacy preferences. For instance, a user
should be able to specify privacy policies for individual blog entries, a
specic picture (or part of it), or comments. Such privacy policy for-
mulation can impact users’ understanding of privacy policies and thus
their success in appropriately employing them. Although Facebook is
a good example of how OSNs have come a long way in implementing
ne-grained privacy policies, its privacy protection mechanism still
lacks key elements. One of the most important is the absence of dis-
tinguishability between accessing and sharing policies.
• Relationship-based: People share their information with others based
on the relationship they have with them. The properties of the rela-
tionship such as strength, direction, type, etc. also aect the way that
people share and disclose their personal information. This is supported
by many studies in social psychology [25, 35, 62]. Consequently, there
is a wide agreement that privacy control in OSNs should be modeled
based on relationships that arise as consequence of the structure of
OSNs (e.g.,[16, 17, 30, 32]).
• Specic to the type of content: In OSNs, users are able to post and share
dierent pieces of information as texts, photos, videos, comments, au-
dio, events, hobbies, location, website (url), etc. A number of studies
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demonstrate that the format of the information and its content have
impact when dening privacy policies, and that there is a relationship
between content types and the way users communicate (like, share,
comment) [15, 41, 42, 64]. For example, Kim and Yang [41] conducted
a study where they found out that posts containing pictures or videos
were more likely to motivate users to like and share them.
• Multiparty: In the denition of a privacy policy all users who are re-
lated to a given piece of information, and such that their privacy can
be aected by that, should be involved in deciding who should access
that item. Furthermore, privacy protection mechanisms have to be able
to automatically detect which pieces of information are co-owned by
whom. As the protection mechanism contains more than one privacy
preference, most of the time users, considered here as co-controllers,
have dierent desires regarding who they want to view this piece of
information. So, it is possible that, within a privacy policy, a user is
permitted and denied access at the same time, which creates a con-
ict in the policies. Suppose that Alice takes a picture of her and Bob,
and uploads it to her space1 and tags Bob. Assume that Alice sets that
her friends can see her picture and that Bob wants to customize his
privacy policies to include only his close friends. In this case Bob’s
privacy preference will conict with some of Alice’s friends. Multi-
party privacy is designed to facilitate the harmonization of collectively
held privacy policies by all users that co-control a piece of informa-
tion, where their privacy might be lost depending on with whom the
co-controlled piece of information is shared.
• Trust-based: Besides being relationship-based, privacy policies need
to take into account a value for the trust of the relationships. Trust
is an important component for building relations in online communi-
ties where users can post and share their personal information, expe-
riences, social activities and opinions without concerns about privacy.
Many studies corroborated that trust has a signicant eect on the
level of information disclosure between users [39]. Thus, in order to
balance the open nature of OSNs and preserve the privacy concerns of
1In this work, we use the term space to refer both to the user’s prole and her interactive
arena. A user prole is a collection of settings and information associated with the user. It
may be dened to be the explicit digital representation of the user’s identity in the context
of the given (OSN) environment. It includes information such as age, location, and interests.
The user interactive arena is the arena for both public interaction and communication with
others (e.g., the wall in Facebook, the Home timeline in Twitter, stream in Diaspora, etc.).
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users, trust has to become a critical factor in privacy protection mech-
anisms.
In order to develop a successful privacy protection mechanism for OSNs,
all of the above features are desirable. In this thesis, we focus only on Mul-
tiparty and Fine-grained privacy policy features. In what follows, we discuss
and give examples of problems arising from the lack of having these features.
Multiparty privacy policy
As we mentioned, users can control access to their data by using the privacy
settings that OSNs provide. They are implemented based on relationships
between the owner of the data item and other users. All the data items in
the user space are owned by that user, so we say that the user is the owner
of such data items. The relationship between the data item owner and other
users depends on the OSN platform and the data item owner’s preference,
e.g., friends, followers, friends of friends, etc. The privacy protection mech-
anism implemented in current OSNs allows users to manage the access to
data items that are uploaded by them or posted in their space. Besides up-
loading and posting, users engage in communication on OSNs via behaviors
that are dependent on the structure of the OSN’s platform and its purpose.
For instance, Facebook oers the following ve behaviors: like, comment,
tag, mention and share2. Whenever a data item is shared, or has tagged or
mentioned users, all the users who are involved should be able to express
their privacy policies. Consider the following example. Assume that Alice
uploaded a picture of herself drinking with her friend Bob. In this case, the
picture is doubtlessly co-owned by both Alice and Bob. In Alice’s privacy set-
ting, she sets that this picture can be viewed by her friends, colleagues and
family. Bob considers this picture to be sensitive and does not want to share
it with Alice’s family and colleagues. Thus, Bob’s privacy will be violated as
his picture will be viewed by Alice’s family and friends. In order to protect
him from such privacy violation, the OSN privacy protection mechanism has
to be properly designed, considering and respecting the privacy preferences
of all involved users.
Hundreds of billions of data items that are uploaded and shared in OSNs
are co-owned by more than one user [37, 63]. Enge conducted a study on 4
million tweets and found that tweets with pictures acquired more than dou-
ble the retweets and likes than a pictureless tweet would [26]. A study pro-
cured by Mention’s Twitter Report [50], showed that almost 40% of tweets
2In the thesis, we consider tagging, mentioning and sharing behaviors.
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include the mention symbol to engage more people in the conversation of the
tweet and alert others to subjects of interest. Scholars have emphasized that
tagging is one of the popular behaviours on OSNs (e.g., Facebook), where
users commonly tag and are tagged [9, 22, 23]. Nowadays on most OSNs
it is possible only for the owner of the space to specify the privacy policies
of co-owned data items regardless of the privacy preferences of other users
who are identied in these data items. Current OSNs oer limited support
for managing co-owned data items where users can only use strategies like
untagging or reporting inappropriate content.
When OSNs’ tags are normally used, users upload a picture and name
other users in it with a link to their prole. There are some OSNs in which the
tagged users receive notications about the pictures they have been tagged
in in order to approve them before the picture appears on their space. If the
tagged users in a picture do not want to share it with their list of connec-
tions (e.g., the user’s Friends List in Facebook), they can untag themselves
from it. However, this strategy does not fulll the users desires for dierent
reasons. Firstly, when tagged users untag themselves from a picture, it does
not mean that the actual picture is removed, or that they block the possibility
of the picture to be accessed by undesired users. For example, assume that
Alice and Bob are in a picture taken during their holiday trip. Alice decided
to upload it to Facebook (making her the owner) tag Bob and share it with
her friends. When Bob received the tag notication, he decided not to share
the picture with his friends list; thus, he took action not to make the picture
appear on his Facebook Timeline by not approving the tag (untagged him-
self). Despite Bob untagging himself and the picture now not appearing in
his own Timeline, the picture will still be viewed by other users according to
Alice settings. So if Bob has common friends with Alice, all these friends will
be able to view the picture in Alice’s Timeline because they are her friends
too. This means, the act of tagging brought Bob into a state where he be-
came connected to the picture by the choice of Alice, and despite untagging
himself, he is still connected to the picture elsewhere in the network (Al-
ice’s space) and accessing and visualizing this tagged picture only depends
on Alice’s privacy policies.
For Bob, the fact that he is related (as co-owner) to the picture does not
give him any control over who can access it from his social circle (like Friends
List in Facebook) or the general social network. This lack of control stems
from the fact that Alice has full rights to determine who can access the pic-
ture. The second limitation in the untagging strategy is that the tagging is
limited to one type of an OSN’s data item, a picture, but is not available for
other items such as posts, events, comments. In posts and comments, OSNs
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users can interact with each other through a mention feature that creates
a direct link to the mentioned user’s prole. In some OSNs (like Facebook
and Twitter) the mentioned users receive a notication that they were men-
tioned. However, these posts or comments that have the mentions are solely
controlled by users who created them. Finally, even though untagging is
used as a management strategy [9], users expressed occasional discomfort at
oending the user who tagged them in the picture by using the untagging
feature [7, 8]. In some extreme situations tagged users are forced to ask the
uploader personally to remove the data item or remove the relationship links.
Most OSNs provide an option for users to report and make a request to
eliminate a data item published by others, for example, because it is inap-
propriate. This option does not guarantee that the data item will denitely
be eliminated, and it is mostly used to handle highly inappropriate contents
such as harassment, hate speech, child endangerment, violence, nudity or
others which are considered publicly oensive. Hence, this mechanism does
not solve the privacy issue due to co-ownership. In many scenarios the pri-
vacy violations do not necessary happen within the context of an oence. For
instance, tagged/mentioned users may simply not feel open to share some in-
formation with other users due to privacy concerns, or they may want to re-
strict the view of this information to a smaller or specic audience. Also, it is
important to point out that reporting is not a proactive mechanism because
agging the data item as inappropriate normally happens after uploading.
So, reporting may be too late, the privacy breach may have already occurred
and the damage may have already been caused, or users may have been able
to copy the data item and disseminate it using other platforms. The bottom
line is that compensatory solutions are in general not enough [58, 59].
Coarse-grained privacy policy
One of OSNs shortcomings is the inexibility of privacy policies to accom-
modate the user’s needs and intentions. This lack of exibility makes many
privacy protection features, still in demand by users, unfullled whilst a few
privacy violations from other users remain unsolved. In practice, many OSNs
(such as Facebook) have already provided helpful and desirable privacy poli-
cies, some of which can help users to manage their data items. For instance, in
Facebook users can specify policies like "Only my friends can see my friends
list", "Only friends of my friends can send me friends requests", "Only my
friends can see what others post on my Timeline" or "The picture where I
was tagged should not appear on my Timeline unless I approve it". Moreover,
Facebook’s users can share their data items with a wide range of predened
9
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users, including friends, groups, friends of friends, or all [13]. These features
enable users (the owner) to dene which data items can be viewed and by
which users. However, given their importance for users, many policies are
missing in current privacy protection mechanisms. In Facebook, users can
not state policies like "Only the users who live in the same country as me can
send me a friend request", "I do not want to be tagged in pictures by anyone
other than the members of my close friends group", "Nobody apart from my
family group can know my child’s location" or "My post can be seen by my
friends and friends of friends but nobody apart from my family group can
share it".
Also, current OSNs’ privacy protection mechanisms oer the same op-
tion of privacy policies without given consideration to the type of data item
to be protected, whether it be a video, a picture, a location, an event, etc.
Thus, users cannot specify their privacy policies according to the type of
data item; for instance, in Facebook users cannot choose a policy like "Only
my friends can see a post having my location", "Only my close friends group
can see a post with a video". Furthermore, presently the privacy protection
mechanisms do not equip the users with feature(s) to identify the level of pri-
vacy concern(s) that they have with regards to their data item. For example,
users are not able to express policies like "I have high sensitivity level for all
posts containing location" or "I have medium sensitivity level for all pictures
that I have been tagged in".
As we mentioned, current privacy protection mechanisms are built based
on relationships. By their very nature, each relationship has its own intensity
(degree of trust), thus relationships among users are not equal [34]. However,
the privacy protection mechanisms make no eort to distinguish between
users’ relationships; users are either in a relationship or are strangers. For
example, in Facebook, users are classied either as friends or outsiders with
nothing to choose from inbetween. At present, privacy protection mecha-
nisms ignore the existence of trust dierences; thus, users are neither able
to express how much they trust other users nor to state policies by using a
trust concept. Again, using Facebook as an example, users cannot specify
policies that apply trust like "Whenever I am tagged by my friends whom I
highly trust, the picture can be shown on my Timeline without approval" or
"My posts can only be shared by highly trusted friends".
In general, OSNs’ privacy policies determine who can access which data
items along with other special privacy policies, which dier from one OSN
to another according to their characteristics and functionality (e.g., untag in
Facebook). However, looking deeper at what users can do with someone else’
data items, there are two main actions: accessing and disseminating (sharing)
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the data items. Since most privacy policies are centered around the data items
accessibility that sharing policies are embedded within it, it can be inferred
that privacy policies are indirectly in control of sharing, although the two
actions are functionally dierent. Using Facebook as an example, suppose
that Alice posted a picture specifying friends of friends privacy policy. This
means it can be seen by her friends and their friends. Bob who is her friend
can not only see the picture but even share it with his friends, friends of
friends or everyone. Imagine now that Bob decides to share it with his friends
of friends; this action will increase the picture’s audience to Alice’s friends of
friends and Bob’s friends of friends. Despite that Alice set her privacy policy
for only her friends of friends to see it, the picture is shared by her friend
Bob and shown to more people than she expected. This lack of having policy
options about sharing leads to undesirable results and privacy breaches.
In view of this, privacy policies need to be exible to accommodate the
user’s needs and intentions, and more ne-grained settings are needed. How-
ever, ne granularity and exible privacy policies may lead to an overwhelm-
ing and complex cognitive demand for the users to deal with them. This rep-
resents a burden that could worsen user’s tendency to ignore policy specica-
tion, and trust the default privacy policies. This obeys to the OSNs’ interests
rather than the users. Additionally, such restricted privacy policies reduce
the amount of data items shared in the OSNs; it makes the OSN platforms
less likely to attract more users, which inevitably decreases their growth. So,
an equilibrium between too little exibility and an excessively complicated
privacy policy management is needed.
2.2 Access Control in Online Social Networks
The privacy protection mechanism that is employed in OSNs today to con-
trol the access and dissemination of users’ information is access control [1].
Access control mechanisms regulate how a subject may access an object [33]
and is one of the most important features of today’s systems to protect access
to data items [6]. It has three main concepts: setting the policies that autho-
rize certain individuals to access certain data items; authenticating evidence
associated with an access request; assessing the access request based on the
given policies [33].
The access control model behind the privacy protection mechanism of
OSNs is readily distinguishable from others access control mechanisms, such
as Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [53], Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
[55], Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [65] and Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) [54]. Several access control models that have been devel-
oped in recent years are aimed at eectively capturing the nature of infor-
11
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mation accessed and shared in OSNs [12, 17, 18, 19, 29, 30]. Several stud-
ies showed ample evidence that users’ relationships should be considered
as a central concept in modeling the privacy protection mechanism of OSN
[17, 29, 31, 35, 62]. In what follows, we provide background on the access
control model OSNs implement.
Relationship-Based Access Control
In Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC), authorizations are specically
based on relationships between users. This new access control paradigm was
initially inspired by the structure of OSNs. Comparing with other access
control models such as DAC, RBAC or ABAC, there are three distinguishing
features of ReBAC model that are identied by Fong et al. [29].
• ReBAC model relies on leveraging social relationships as access policies.
So, users specify the audience of their data items based on their di-
rect or indirect relationship with others. Consider Alice, in Figure 1,
who may state a policy that makes Pic solely accessible to her family
members, that is Bob. Alternatively, she can specify that Pic can be
accessed by her indirect family members (i.e., family of family) which
results in Bob’s family members. Another policy option can be public
which gives accessibility to everyone in OSN’s platform.
• Before granting the access to any data item, it has to be reachable in
the social graph. Reachability is a necessary step prior setting policies
regarding accessibility. In Figure 1 for example, Bob is reachable from
Alice through family relation. Thence, Bob can access Pic if permission
is granted. On the other hand, Carol would not be able to access Pic,
since Alice and Bob are not reachable by him.
• Abstraction of the succession of events and interactions that take place in
the system. According to many access control systems, authorization
is a function that depends on the sequence of events and interactions
[56]. As shown in Figure 1, family relationship is a bidirectional rela-
tion that indicates to both users that they are required to agree before
establishing the relationship. Envision that Carol wants to access Al-
ice’s picture (Pic). In order to achieve that one possible option can be
as following: 1) Carol sends a friendship request to Alice; 2) Alice ac-
cepts the request; 3) Carol would be able access the Pic if Alice sets
policies that grant her friends accessibility. In ReBAC, the sequence of
events is abstracted into the social graph. Continuing with our previ-
ous example, the impact of Alice and Carol becoming friends produces
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a friend relationship between them. This abstraction of the event his-
tory becomes a basis of authorization decisions in ReBAC.
ReBAC is a paradigm that captures the nature of information accessing
in OSNs by taking into account users’ relationships as a core concept [30].
However, the ongoing privacy violations in OSNs indicate that ReBAC as
applied on OSNs has limitations which means this model might need to be
revised. Mondal et al. discuss insuciency of managing privacy in OSNs by
applying access control, while Fogues et al. discuss a few open challenges in
ReBAC for OSNs [28, 51]. They bring up, among others, the following issues:
1. A privacy protection mechanism is needed to enforce the privacy prefer-
ences of all involved users when dealing with a data item that is related to
other users. This issue relates to the aforementioned problem of lack of
having Multiparty policies. To address multiple ownership in ReBAC,
the model has to be extended to consider all dierent relationship con-
texts between a co-owned data item and the involved users. Moreover,
the model should focus on supporting the detection and resolution of
multiparty privacy conicts, since individual privacy preferences may
conict because other involved users in the co-owned data item may
want to grant access to or share it with dierent audiences. The recent
line of work on privacy management and access control for OSNs is
tackling this issue [58].
2. Privacy policies that OSNs provide do not capture how data items should
be disseminated. In OSNs, it is also important for the owner of the data
item or all involved users in case of co-owned data to specify privacy
policies that limit who can disseminate their data items. For example,
Alice might feel open to permit Bob an access to Pic, but maybe she
does not want him to share it with Carol who, originally, did not have
the right to view the Pic. It is important to design a mechanism that
empowers users to express privacy policies that determinate who can
disseminate their data items and who cannot. Ongoing work on con-
trolling a shared data item is handling this issue [32, 44]. This issue is
related to the problem arising from lack of Fine-grained policy.
All in all, these two privacy issues show that OSNs’ privacy protection
mechanisms should be supportive by multiparty privacy management as tra-
ditional single-user approaches lack the exibility to accommodate the co-
owned data scenarios, causing undesired disclosure of sensitive data. More-
over, OSNs’ privacy policies should be more expressive. In the next section,
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we introduce our approach to address some of the privacy issues we have
described.
3 Thesis Overview
Our aim in this work is to provide a framework that empowers OSNs’ users
to collectively manage viewing and sharing their co-owned data items. As
conicting policies are commonly raised in multiple ownership privacy pro-
tection mechanisms, we proposed Viewing and Sharing aggregation-based
algorithms which make a decision by solving potential conicts between the
dierent privacy settings of all the concerned users. This is achieved by tak-
ing into account the following aspects: the trust among users; the sensitivity
level of users with respect to the concerned data item; and the weights of the
following: (i) the types of controllers (those who are concerned in the deci-
sion that determines who can access a given data item and who cannot) and
(ii) the types of accessors (those who are identied to access a given data item
or not). We evaluated our solution by generating all possible combinations
of components and performed experiments to show how the dierent com-
ponents aect the decision on who should or should not, access or share the
data items. Furthermore, we provided proof-of-concept implementation into
the open source OSN Diaspora. This work is currently under submission to
the Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming (JLAMP) 2019
and was co-authored by Raúl Pardo, Gerardo Schneider and Pablo Picazo-
Sanchez.
Regarding my contributions, I proposed the collaborative access control
model, formalized the policies and developed the collaborative access con-
trol algorithms. Moreover, I implemented the proof-of-concept prototype in
Diaspora.
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Abstract. Most Online Social Networks allow users to set their pri-vacy settings concerning posting information, but current imple-
mentations do not allow a ne grained enforcement in case the posted
item concerns other users. In this paper we propose a new collabora-
tive access control framework that takes into account the relation of
multiple users for viewing as well as for sharing items, eventually solv-
ing conicts in the privacy settings of the users involved. Our solution
is based on the sensitive level of users with regard to the posted item
and on trust among users. We provide a thorough evaluation of our
framework where we focus on how varying some of the parameters di-
rectly inuence the outcome of the permitting/denying decision of the
proposed algorithms. Last but not least, we present a proof-of-concept
implementation of our approach in Diaspora, an open source social net-
work.

1 Introduction
Most Online Social Networks (OSNs) today have privacy settings that allow
users to dene their preferences in what concerns the use of their data. This
usually includes aspects related to whom can have access to which informa-
tion but it is limited in a number of ways. For example, in OSNs like Facebook
or Twitter users may only describe who is the direct audience of a given item
(post, message, picture, etc.), meaning that it only concerns who has access
to the item based on the explicit relationships the user has previously de-
ned. In many cases it involves only one level in the relationship order or
two levels, e.g., friends or friends of friends. This is a limitation since users
might be interested in dening privacy policies that limit the access to other
users not directly connected with them beyond two levels. This is the case,
for instance, whenever somebody who originally got access to the informa-
tion, wants to share it with other users unrelated to the original source of the
item.
In the majority of OSNs, the audience of a piece of information uploaded
to the system is solely dened by a single user. Typically, the user dening the
audience is the one uploading the data, be to her own space, or somewhere
else.1 However, many other users may also be concerned with the posted
data, so they should also have a say in who may access or not. Ideally, there
should be a mechanism allowing all the involved users to take a decision
collaboratively.
Current implementations of social networks rely on the so called Relationship-
based Access Control (ReBAC) model [12] where the social relationships be-
tween users are used to express access control policies. Though ReBAC has
been shown to have many advantages with respect to other access control
models in OSNs [10, 12] it does not allow a ne grained enforcement in case
1In this work, we use the term space to refer both to the user’s prole and her interactive
arena. A user prole is a collection of settings and information associated with the user. It
may be dened to be the explicit digital representation of the user’s identity in the context
of the given (OSN) environment. It includes information such as age, location, and interests.
The user interactive arena is the arena for both public interaction and communication with
others (e.g., the wall in Facebook, the Home timeline in Twitter, stream in Diaspora, etc.).
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the posted item concerns many users, and the privacy settings usually do not
allow for setting limits when a user wants to share the item she got access to.
This lack of collaborative policies for access control may violate the privacy
of the users who are part of the uploaded content, since they cannot decide
who should access it: only the uploader of the data can decide that.
Additionally, apart from the aforementioned problem, ReBAC does not
properly address users’ policy conicts. It is possible that, within an access
control policy, a user is permitted and denied access at the same time, thus
creating a conict in the policy. Thus, there is a need to solve the conicts
before deciding who has access to the shared object [29, 30, 31].
A promising line of work for collaborative access control is the so-called
aggregation-based models [29]. Using this approach the individual privacy
preferences of all users related to an item are aggregated to decide, for in-
stance, whether the item can be shared. However, the main drawback is that
existing models (such as [17, 35]) are too coarse grained to cover all cases,
and, in some cases, rely again on the data owner to choose a conict resolu-
tion strategy.
We propose aViewing and a Sharing aggregation-based algorithms which
take a decision by solving potential conicts between the dierent privacy
settings of all the concerned users. Our algorithms rely on four dierent
components: the sensitivity level of the users with respect to the concerned
item, a trust relationship between users, and dierent weights for both the
controller types and accessor types.2 In order to be as general as possible, try-
ing to cover most of the existing OSNs nowadays, we include in our model
factors to give (or take) importance to some components. In this way, by giv-
ing dierent values to such factors we can obtain dierent results in what
concerns the decisions to grant or deny viewing/sharing capabilities. This
gives us the possibility to tune the decision policy, getting the outcome to
range from very conservative (e.g., a strong denial from one party may over-
rule all the others) to more liberal (e.g., a majority granting access impose
their decision).
We evaluate our solution by generating all possible combinations of the
components under consideration (for a given value of the factors), and we
perform experiments to show how the factors inuence the decision on who
should, or should not, access or share the posted items. Additionally, we pro-
vide a proof-of-concept implementation into the open source OSN Diaspora
[8].
In summary, our contributions are:
2Controller and accessor types will be dened in Section 2; for the time being it suces to
know that they represent all the dierent users concerned with the item under consideration.
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• A collaborative access control framework for OSNs taking into ac-
count: a trust relationship between users, sensitivity level of the users
with respect to the concerned item, and dierent weights for both the
controller types and accessor types (Section 2);
• An algorithm for collaboratively deciding who has access to an item
(Section 2.3.1), and an algorithm to take such decision in case of sharing
the item (Section 2.3.2);
• An evaluation of the behaviour of our algorithms based on an analysis
of how the dierent components aect the decision to grant or deny
access and sharing (Section 3);
• A proof of concept implementation of our framework in Diaspora (Sec-
tion 3.1).
We compare our approach with previous work in Section 4, and we con-
clude in the last section.
2 ACollaborativeAccessControl Framework forOSNs
Our framework consists of three components: 1) an OSN model (Section 2.1);
2) access control policies (Section 2.2), and; 3) the collaborative access control
mechanism (Section 2.3).
2.1 OSN Model
OSNs are typically structured as graphs, where vertices represent users and
items whereas the edges of the graph represent connections between nodes.
Concretely, vertices in the model are split into actors, items, and groups. Ac-
tors represent the real users of OSNs.3 Each actor has a space, which includes
the user’s prole and interactive arena. An item is a digital representation of
the physical object (e.g.,picture, text) to be posted, shared, etc. A group rep-
resents a spot that connects a collection of users who have the same beliefs,
interests, behaviours, etc.
We also consider Relationship types to represent connections between
vertices in the graph. For simplicity of presentation, and without loss of gen-
erality, in the rest of the paper we assume that there can exist only one rela-
tionship between any two vertices in the graph. In what follows we formally
describe the OSN model that we use thorough this paper.
3For us it is not important whether the user is a physical individual, or an institution or
corporation.
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Figure 1.1: A Sample OSN Model
Denition 1 (OSN Model). Let A be a set of actors, I a set of items and G a
set of groups. Consider also a set of relationship typesRT . An OSN model is a
graph SG = (A∪I ∪G, {Ri}i∈RT ) where the vertices in the graph are elements
of one of the setsA, I or G, and eachRi ⊆ (A∪I∪G)×(A∪I∪G) is a binary
relation representing the edges of the graph.
Figure 1.1 shows an example of an OSN. In this example, there are four
actors, a post (p) and a group (g). The post is uploaded by Alice who men-
tions her family members Bob and Carol. Also, the group g was created by
Carol, and Alice is a member of it. As it can be seen, the social network has
relationships between actors and the item, e.g., owner (Alice owns the post
p) and mentioned (Bob and Carol are mentioned in the post p); relationships
between actors and groups, e.g., owner (Carol owns the group g) and member
(Alice is a member of the group g); and relationships between actors4, e.g.,
family (both Bob and Carol are in a family relationship with Alice) and friend
(David is a friend of both Carol and Alice).
Trust Model. Trust becomes a crucial concept in OSNs for improving pri-
vacy mechanisms and reducing concerns about disclosing personal informa-
tion [19]. Dierent techniques have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [4,
14, 20, 21]) to determine the optimum path and the trust value among users
in OSNs. Ordinarily, people would like to express their trust using natu-
ral languages instead of numerical values. The FuzzyTrust algorithm [21]
4Here we consider that the relationships between actors are symmetric, though this might
not be the case in general.
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Table 1.1: Trust level weights
Linguistic term Numerical value
none 0
low 0.25
medium 0.50
high 0.75
highest 1
allows us to do that, so in this work we use such algorithm to compute
the trust between users. FuzzyTrust requires a trust graph where edges are
labelled with the following set of Trust Linguistic Terms (T LT ) T LT =
{none, low,medium,high,highest}.
We assign to each of the elements of T LT a numerical value (see Ta-
ble 1.1), used in our algorithms (Section 2.3). Hence, we dene a trust graph as
TG= (A,T R) where vertices are actors (A), which represent the OSN users,
and edges T R ⊆ A×T LT ×A are dened as a set of triples (a, tv,v), indi-
cating that a’s trust level for v is equal to tv. The function infer :A×A→ R
computes the numerical trust value between two actors in a trust graph (note
that (1 − infer) corresponds to the distrust value). Given a trust graph TG,
we use the notation TG.infer to retrieve trust values among the actors in TG.
When actors are directly connected in the trust graph, infer simply returns
the numerical value corresponding to the label between the actors. On the
contrary, if actors are not directly connected, infer applies the FuzzyTrust
algorithm (see [21] for details). For instance, Alice may assign a high trust
level for all her friends and a medium trust level to all her family except Bob
who is assigned to a low level. The infer function computes the numerical
value for trust between Alice and each of her friends, her family and Bob as
following: 0.75, 0.50 and 0.25,respectively.
Associated Controllers. Similarly to [17], for each item we consider a set
of associated controllers, representing all the actors of the OSN concerned in
the decision of who should have access to a given item. We dene a set of
controllers types CT ⊆ RT as {owner,stakeholder,contributor,originator}.
Though the elements inRT may dier depending on the concrete OSN, we
require that the elements in CT are always included in RT . We dene the
set of associated controllers to item i as Ci = {c | (c, i) ∈ Rj where j ∈ C}
described in what follows.
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Owner. All the items in the actor space are owned by that actor. We say
that the actor is the owner of all those items. In our model we include
an owner relation between an actor and an item every time an item is
posted in her space. We use the relationship owner to indicate when
an actor is the owner of an item.
Stakeholder. A stakeholder is an actor who is tagged or mentioned in an
item. We use the relationship stakeholder to indicate when an actor is
a stakeholder of an item.
Contributor. A contributor is an actor who posts an item in a space dier-
ent than hers, e.g., Alice posting in Bob’s space, making Alice to be a
contributor for that post and Bob is the owner. We use the relationship
contributor to indicate when an actor is a contributor of an item.
Originator. An actor is considered to be an originator when an item is shared
from her space—note that the owner is the only one who can become
an originator. For instance, if Alice shares an item from Bob’s space
to Carol’s space, then Bob is the originator of the item. We use the
relationship originator to indicate when an actor is an originator of an
item.
Note that for each item there is exactly one owner, at most one contributor,
at most one originator, and zero or more stakeholders.
Controllers TypesWeight. In our framework the associated controllers do
not necessarily have the same importance. We use the principle that close
people tend to be similar [2, 9], and thus we give the stakeholders the same
importance as the owner for two reasons: 1) they are explicitly mentioned (or
tagged) without their approval, and; 2) stakeholders who are conventionally
related to the content of the item, by some way or another, becomes liable to
the disclosure of their sensitive information.
Regarding the contributor and the originator controllers, and contrarily
to other proposals (e.g., [18, 27, 28]), we get them involved into the collab-
orative decision. The main dierence with respect to the owner and stake-
holder(s) is that we take into account the distance between them and the
owner in the OSN model, and we give them dierent values. The distance
between the owner and each associated controller is dened as the shorter
connection path length between them considering all the relationships that
connect them.
We propose two algorithms, Viewing and Sharing, corresponding to the
dierent actions that an actor (associated controller) may do concerning an
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Table 1.2: Controllers types’ weights. Column 1 represents the types of associated con-
trollers; column 2 shows the algorithms for producing the collaborative decisions; column
3 is the minimum distance among all the social relationships between the owner and the
associated controller; column 4 shows the weight we assign to the associated controllers
Controller type Algorithm Distance Weight
Owner Viewing and Sharing - 1
Stakeholder Viewing and Sharing - 1
Contributor Viewing and Sharing 1 0.50
Contributor Viewing and Sharing ≥ 2 0.25
Originator Viewing 1 0.50
Originator Viewing ≥ 2 0.25
Originator Sharing -
0.25 if TG.infer(originator,owner) ≥ 0.750.75 otherwise
item. The algorithms depend on several parameters, among others theweight
of the associated controllers.
Each associated controller is weighted based on whether she is involved
in the process of making the collaborative decision regarding viewing or
sharing an item, and her distance from the owner. Table 1.2 shows how this
weight is dened for each associated controller in both algorithms. Note that
for the owner and stakeholder types, the weight is always one and it does not
depend on the distance since both are equally involved in the process of mak-
ing a collaborative decision. In the case of the contributor, she is weighted
dierently based on her distance from the owner in both algorithms (see rows
3 and 4).
For the originator, the weight is dierent for each algorithm: for Viewing
the distance is calculated in the same way as for the contributor, whereas for
Sharing the distance is not relevant as she is weighted based on the trust level
between herself and the owner. The trust level is used to indicate how much
inuence an originator’s opinion will have on the aggregated decision. In
this case, if the originator highly trusts the owner (with a value ≥ 0.75) then
the weight is only 0.25, otherwise it will be 0.75. In other words, when the
originator highly trusts the owner, the task of deciding whether to share or
not is delegated to the trustee.
In what follows, we use a function wct : CT → R to retrieve the weight
of a controller type.
2.2 Access Control Policies
In this section, we introduce the access control policies that our collabora-
tive algorithms use. Before explaining what an access control policy is and
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how it is represented, we introduce two concepts: accessor specications and
sensitivity levels of data items.
Accessor Specication. In our framework each associated controller can
identify a set of actors who can access her data and who cannot, the so-
called accessors. Associated controllers can specify their permitted and de-
nied accessors using the following accessor types: actor names, group names
and relationship names. Formally, we dene the set of accessor types as
AT = {an,gn,rn}. Many OSNs allow users to specify who can access their
information using these accessor types; they have also been used in other
collaborative access control frameworks like in [17]. These accessor types
help the controllers to customize their access control policies.
Denition 2 (Accessor specication). We dene an accessor specication as
pair (A∪G∪RT )×AT . We useAS to denote the set of accessor specifcations.
For example, the accessor specication 〈Alice,an〉 indicates that Alice is
specied as actor, while 〈f riends,rn〉 denotes that controller determines her
friends relationship either to access her data or not. We denote the universe
of accessor specications as, UAS ⊆ 2AS . Accessor types are organized hi-
erarchically forming a total order: rn > gn > an where y > x means that x
is more specic than y (or that y is more general than x). As we dene be-
low, denying or permitting an actor by means of a policy that uses a specic
accessor type contributes more to the nal decision than policies using less
specic accessor types.
Accessor TypeWeight. In our framework, not all accessor types are equal.
For example, we consider that directly denying an actor (“Alice is denied”)
should have a “stronger” eect on a collaborative decision than indirectly
denying an actor because it belongs to a relationship (“My friends are de-
nied”, where Alice is one of the friends). Thus, we weight the accessor types
based on the most-specic-takes-precedence principle [6, 7]. We dene the
function wat : AT → R to retrieve the weight of an accessor type, e.g.,
wat(getAccessorType(a, i))where getAccessorType(a, i) ∈ {an,gn,rn} accord-
ing to the denition in Table 1.3.
Sensitivity levels of data items. The actor’s space, relationships and items,
embody the actor’s data in OSNs. Using sensitivity levels, the associated con-
trollers of an item indicate how much a disclosure of the item would harm
them. In what follows we dene a set of sensitivity levels that associated
controllers can add in their access control policies (see Denition 3). Let
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Table 1.3: Accessor types weights
Accessor Type Numerical value
an 1
gn 0.75
rn 0.50
Table 1.4: Sensitivity levels
Linguistic term Numerical value
none 0
low 0.25
medium 0.50
high 1
SL = {none, low,medium,high} be the set of sensitivity level linguistic terms.
The sensitivity levels are shown in Table 1.4: the linguistic terms, which are
the inputs that are assigned by the associated controllers, correspond to nu-
merical values. We use the function wsl : SL→ R to acquire the numerical
value associated to the sensitivity level linguistic term.
Access Control Policies. The associated controllers can dene their pri-
vacy preferences, where the policy of each controller aects the collaborative
decision of viewing and sharing an item. We dene an access control policy
as follows.
Denition 3. An access control policy is a tuple 〈i, c,ct, sl,PER,DEN〉where:
i) i ∈ I is the item to which this policy applies; ii) c ∈ is the associated controller
who denes the policy over the considered item; iii) ct ∈ CT is the type of the
associated controller—automatically extracted from the corresponding relation
in the OSN model; iv) sl ∈ SL is the sensitivity level of the considered item;
v) PER and DEN ∈ UAS are two accessor specication sets indicating the ac-
tors permitted and denied to view the item, respectively.
We denote the universe of access control policies asUACP ⊆ 2I×A×CT ×SL×UAS×UAS .
For every item i ∈ I , we use ACPi ∈ UACP to denote the set of access con-
trol policies of the associated controllers . We denote the access control pol-
icy of each associated controller as acpc, where c ∈ A. Given ACPi we use
ACPi .acpc.e to refer to an element e of the access control policy tuple. Let
us illustrate an access control policy with an example as follows: "Alice per-
31
1. A Collaborative Access Control Framework for Online Social Networks
forms a post (p) (she is the owner) and grants all actors who have a family
relationship with her to view the p and denies all her friends to view her post
p, with high sensitivity level". Such access control policy for that post p is
expressed as: acp = 〈p,Alice,owner,high, {〈family,rn〉}, {〈friends,rn〉}〉.
Note that we provide support to explicitly specify permitted and denied
actors. This feature is present in OSNs such as Facebook, where actors can,
for instance, share an item with their friends, and additionally, explicitly
exclude other actors. For instance, consider a policy dened by Bob with:
PER = {〈friends,rn〉} and DEN = {〈Alice,an〉}—assuming that the item is
shared with Bob’s friends and Alice is the actor to be excluded. Note that
Alice may, or may not, be friend with Bob. The potential set of actors that
may be granted viewing permission is the union of all the permitted actors
of all policies for the item, formally,
⋃
acp∈ACPi acp.PER. Every time that an
actor in DEN is included in the previous union, a conict may arise, as it will
be the case in the example if Alice is in the permitted set of other associated
controller. (We describe the conict resolution algorithm in Section 2.3).
Note that specifying only permitted actors and marking the other actors
in the OSN as denied, or vice versa, is a strictly less expressive choice—in
particular the policy above would not be possible to express. So, expressing
such cases in our framework is possible, but it may be tedious—the denied
and permitted sets may contain a large number of actors. In order to model
this in a compact manner, we use a special element ⊥ that can be included
in DEN and represents “all actors not in PER”. Likewise, we use the ele-
ment> in PER to denote “all actors not in DEN”. For instance, a policy with
PER = {〈Alice,an〉} and DEN = {⊥}means “Alice is permitted and anybody
else is denied”, and with PER = {>} and DEN = {〈Alice,an〉} means “Alice
is denied and anybody else is permitted”. Note that PER and DEN can be
empty. Intuitively, polices where PER is not empty and DEN is empty spec-
ify only permitted actors, e.g., PER = {Alice} and DEN = ∅ means Alice is
permitted and nobody is denied. Note the dierent with DEN = {⊥} where
everybody except for Alice is denied. Not specifying denied actors does not
mean that everyone can access the item. In particular, in the example above,
Alice is the only actor who may be permitted to access the item. Dening
DEN = ∅ simply imposes no restrictions in the set of permitted actors that
other associated controllers may allow (in their respective PER sets). For ex-
ample, consider a policy with PER = {Alice} and DEN = ∅, and a dierent
policy for the same item with PER = {Bob} and DEN = ∅, then the audience
of the item is only {Alice,Bob} (see Section 2.3.1). The intuition behind poli-
cies with PER = ∅ and DEN , ∅ is the inverse of the previous explanation,
i.e., they specify only denied actors and leave unspecied the permitted set
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of actors.
Normalization of Accessor Specications. It is possible that, within a
single access control policy, an actor is permitted and denied access at the
same time, thus creating a conict in the policy. These conicts may arise
explicitly or implicitly. An explicit conict occurs when a concrete actor,
group or relationship type is explicitly included in the permitted and denied
accessors sets at the same time. Implicit conicts may occur, for instance,
if an actor appears explicitly in the permitted accessors set but the denied
accessors set includes a group or relationship where the actor is a mem-
ber of—e.g., if Alice is a friend of Bob and we have PER = {〈friends,rn〉}
and DEN = {〈Alice,an〉}. Also, when an actor is a member of two dierent
groups that appear in the denied and permitted accessor sets, respectively—
i.e., imagine that Alice belongs to the groups engineers and mathematicians,
and we have PER = {〈mathematicians,gn〉} and DEN = {〈engineers,gn〉}.
Similarly, if an actor is a member of two dierent relationship types that ap-
pear as permitted and denied, a conict occurs. Finally, if an actor belongs to
a relationship type and a group that appear in dierent sets, it will cause
a conict, e.g., PER = {〈mathematicians,gn〉} and DEN = {〈friends,rn〉}
would cause a conict since Alice belongs to both.
To resolve explicit conicts we check that the sets of permitted and de-
nied accessors are be mutually exclusive, i.e., PER∩DEN = ∅.
Resolving implicit conicts requires looking into the following cases:
i) Actors permitted and denied at dierent hierarchical levels, and; ii) Ac-
tors permitted and denied in dierent groups or relationship types.
Before handling the specic kinds of implicit conicts, we apply a pre-
processing step where we replace pairs 〈G,gn〉with 〈m1,gn〉, 〈m2,gn〉, . . . ,∀mi ∈
G in the accessor specication sets PER and DEN. Likewise, we replace re-
lationship types pairs such as 〈R,rn〉 with their members. As a result we
obtain the multisets MPER and MDEN . We use multisets because it is nec-
essary for our conict resolution strategies to count how many times a pair
appears. Note that the pairs in these sets have the type A ×AT since we
replaced every group and relationship type with their members. Therefore,
we can now syntactically identify conicts by checking the rst element of
the pairs.
In order to resolve conicts between actors at dierent hierarchical levels
we apply the most-specic-takes-precedence principle [6, 7]. It states that the
accessor specication that is more specic should remain. For example, if
Bob is in the permitted set as an actor an, and in the denied set because
he belongs to a group gn, the strategy removes Bob from the denied set.
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Formally, we apply the following principle: “If 〈a,atx〉 ∈ X and 〈a,aty〉 ∈
Y and atx is more specic than aty , then X := X \ {〈a,atx〉} where X,Y ∈
{MPER,MDEN}” where the operation \ over multisets discards all occurrences
of the elements to remove.
Once we apply the previous step, there might still exist conicts among
groups or relationship types at the same hierarchical level—e.g., if Alice be-
longs to the groups co-workers and family, and she has permitted one but not
the other. To resolve this type of conict, we apply themany-takes-precedence
principle [7], i.e., the higher number of positive/negative policies prevail.
Formally, given the multisets X,Y ∈ {MPER,MDEN} this principle updates
them as follows: X = X\{〈a,at〉} if count(〈u,at〉,Y ) > count(〈a,at〉,X)where
at ∈ {gn,rn}, and count(e,S) returns the number of appearances of element e
in a multiset S . Note that in the previous strategy we require that the number
of elements in one set must be strictly greater than in the other.
Finally, there can still be conicts if there is the same number of appear-
ances in both multisets. To solve these conicts we use the denial-takes-
precedence principle [7]. It simply keeps the pair appearing in the denied ac-
cessors set and removes it from the permitted accessors set. Formally, given
at ∈ {gn,rn}, MPER =MPER \ {〈a,at〉} if 〈a,at〉 ∈ (MPER ∩MDEN).
After applying the previous steps in the described order, we add all the
elements from MPER to PER and MDEN to DEN to remove any remaining
duplicate pairs. The resulting PER and DEN sets are not in conict. Hence,
for the rest of the paper, we assume that the sets PER and DEN are conict-
free.
2.3 Collaborative Access Control
In this section, we introduce our collaborative access control algorithms.
These algorithms correspond to two actions that users may perform in the
OSN which can potentially involve the controllers types in our model: view-
ing and sharing. In a nutshell, viewing corresponds to the event of accessing
(view) to an existing data item. Sharing, on the other hand, consists in se-
lecting an existing item and share a copy in another prole.
2.3.1 Collaborative Access Control: Viewing
Here we present Algorithm 1, an algorithm that produces the list of actors
that can view an item. It takes as input three parameters: 1) a set of ac-
cess control policies ACPi for the item i; 2) the set of associated controllers
for this item Ci , and; 3) the trust graph (TG). As output, it returns a set
of viewers, i.e., actors that can view item i. First, we include the set of as-
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sociated controllers Ci in the set of viewers. Thus, modeling that all as-
sociated controllers will always be able to view the item. Second, we use
the function normalize(ACPi) to resolve internal conicts within each in-
dividual policy as described in the previous section. Also we use an exter-
nal procedure named generateAcccesors(ACPi) to create a set of all possi-
ble viewers from the access control policies (ACPi ) of the item. Concretely,
generateAcccesors(ACPi) computes the union of all the actors that appear
in the sets of accessor specications PER and DEN of the policies in ACPi .
Formally, generateAcccesors(ACPi) =
{a | (a,at) ∈ acp.PER,acp ∈ ACPi} ∪
{a | (a,at) ∈ acp.DEN,acp ∈ ACPi}
The set is created by adding the actors specied in the sets PER and DEN of
each policy to ACPi . The algorithm aggregates the weights of the controller
types, accessor types, trust level and sensitivity level indicated in the ac-
cess control policies dened by the associated controllers according to Equa-
tions (1.1) and (1.2) below. Concretely, we use Equation (1.1) for accessor
specications in the PER set, and Equation (1.2) for accessor specications
in the DEN set.
decision_permit = φct ·wct(acp.ct) + φat ·wat(getAccessorType(a,acp.i)) +
φtr ·TG.infer(acp.c,a) + φsl ·wsl(acp.sl)
(1.1)
decision_deny = φct ·wct(acp.ct) + φat ·wat(getAccessorType(a,acp.i)) +
φtr · (1−TG.infer(acp.c,a)) + φsl ·wsl(acp.sl)
(1.2)
The equations depend, among other things, on four factors: φct ,φat ,φtr ,φsl
(where each φi ∈ [0,1]) representing the importance we give to each one of
the dierent components of the equation. In particular,φct aects the weight
of controller types, φat aects the weight of accessor types, φtr aects the
trust and φsl aects the sensitivity level of the item. In the rest of the paper
we omit the factors in our examples for sake of simplifying the presentation.
Note that the decision_permit and decision_deny equations are present
in the algorithm as part of the computation of the variable decision. Their
value must be computed n times where n ranges from 1 (the owner must al-
ways exist) to len (the total amount of associated controllers involved in the
decision). The nal result is given as decision =
∑len
n=1 decision_permitn−
decision_denyn. If decision > 0 then the accessor can access the item,
otherwise she cannot. Note that by using our proposed collaborative access
control framework, each associated controller of an item has the ability to
aect the nal decision.
35
1. A Collaborative Access Control Framework for Online Social Networks
input : ACPi , Ci and TG
output: viewers
viewers← Ci
normalize(ACPi)
set_accessors← generateAcccesors(ACPi)
foreach a ∈ set_accessors do
decision← 0
foreach acp ∈ ACPi do
if a ∈ acp.PER then
decision← decision + φct ·wct(acp.ct)+
φat ·wat(getAccessorType(a,acp.i))+
φtr ·TG.infer(acp.c,a)+ φsl ·wsl(acp.sl)
end
else if a ∈ acp.DEN then
decision← decision − φct ·wct(acp.ct)+
φat ·wat(getAccessorType(a,acp.i))+
φtr · (1−TG.infer(acp.c,a))+ φsl ·wsl(acp.sl)
end
end
if decision > 0 then
viewers← viewers∪ {a}
end
end
Algorithm 1: Viewing
Example 1. Consider that Alice performs a post p and mentions her family
members Bob and Carol. Alice is the owner whereas Bob and Carol are the
stakeholders. Their access control policies are, ACPp =
{〈p,Alice,owner, low, {〈family,rn〉}, {〈friends,rn〉}〉,
〈p,Bob,stakeholder,medium, {〈co-worker,rn〉},∅},
〈p,Carol,stakeholder, low, {〈friends,rn〉},∅}.
Consider now an actor (David), who is a friend of Alice and Carol. In ACPp
Alice denies her friends whereas Carol allows her friends. In this scenario, the
positive and negative authorizations about David’s access create a conict. The
permitted decision value (decision_permit) is aggregated from Carol’s acp
which aects David’s access as he is a friend of her. Carol has a low sensitivity
level for the post p. On the other hand, the algorithm computes the value of a
denied decision from acp of Alice which aects David’s access as he is her friend.
Alice also has a low sensitivity level for the post p. owner and stakeholder are
36
2. A Collaborative Access Control Framework for OSNs
weighted 1 as dened in Table 1.2. For the purpose of this example, let Alice
dene a trust value of 0.75 for David whereas Carol sets a trust value of 0.5 for
David. According to these trust values and the associated controllers’ privacy
policies, the value of decision_deny = 2 based on Equation (1.2) whereas the
value of decision_permit = 2.25 based on Equation (1.1). So, David will
have access to view the post.
2.3.2 Collaborative Access Control: Sharing
Our second algorithm produces a set of actors that can share an item which
has been previously posted (see Algorithm 2). We call disseminators the ac-
tors that have the right to share an item. The event of sharing an item con-
sists in copying an already posted item and placing it in the disseminators
space. The shared item placed in the disseminator’s space is dierent from
the original item in the owner space. Note that a shared item has one owner,
one originator, and zero or more stakeholders—because we restrict sharing
to the disseminator space.
This algorithm, as opposed to Algorithm 1, includes two phases: 1) lter-
ing viewers in potential allowed disseminators and potential denied dissemi-
nators, based on the trust that the associated controllers have for each viewer
(specied sharing policies, Denition 4 below), and; 2) an aggregation-based
method similar to that of Algorithm 1 to decide whether the conicting actor—
i.e., an actor permitted by some associated controllers and denied by other
associated controllers—might become a disseminator.
Sharing Policies. For sharing, each associated controller species a trust
threshold that determines how much the minimum value of trust between
her and the viewer has to be in order to allow the sharing action.
Denition 4 (Sharing Policies). Wedene a sharing policy as a tuple 〈i, c, trc〉
where: 1) i ∈ I is the item to which the policy applies; 2) c ∈ A is the associated
controller who denes the sharing policy, and; 3) trc ∈ R is a numerical value
specifying the trust threshold for which sharing the item i is permitted by c.
For every item i ∈ I , SPi ∈ USP is the set of sharing policies (with
USP ⊆ 2I×A×R). The numerical value in trc is obtained from a T LT that the
associated controller selects when dening the policy—Table 1.1 contains the
equivalences between TLTs and their corresponding numerical value. Given
a sharing policy sp we use sp.e to refer to an element e of the sharing policy
tuple, e.g., sp.trc refers to the trust threshold of the sharing policy sp.
Algorithm 2 takes as input four parameters: 1) a set of access control
policies ACPi for the given item i; 2) the trust graph (TG); 3) a set of viewers
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(computed using Algorithm 1), and; 4) the sharing thresholds associated to
the item i, SPi . As output, it returns the set of actors that can share the item.
In what follows we explain the two phases of the algorithm in detail.
Phase 1). As mentioned earlier, SPi contains the sharing policies for item
i. These policies determine the minimum value of trust between the associ-
ated controller and the actor who might share the item. We use an external
procedure named filterActors (i,TG,SPi ,viewers) to split the potential dis-
seminators into actors who do (permit_sharing) and do not (deny_sharing)
fulll the sharing policies SPi set in advance by each associated controller.
The pseudo-code of the procedure is shown below:
foreach a ∈ viewers do
foreach sp ∈ SPi do
tr = TG.infer(sp.c,a);
if tr ≥ sp.trc then
permit_sharing← permit_sharing∪ {c};
else
deny_sharing← deny_sharing∪ {c};
end
end
end
Procedure lterActors(i,TG,SPi ,viewers)
Given an item i, the above procedure includes a viewer v in the set of
potentially permitted disseminators (permit_sharing), if an associated con-
troller c has specied a sharing policy sp that includes a trust level lower than
the trust the associated controller dened for the viewer, i.e., TG.infer(sp.c,a) ≥
sp.trc. Otherwise the actor is included in the set of potentially denied dissem-
inators (deny_sharing). Note that, since permit_sharing and deny_sharing
are sets, each viewer can appear at most once in each set.
Phase 2). When a conict arises among the associated controllers to al-
low or refuse the sharing action of the item i, for all involved associated con-
trollers we have to dierentiate between two cases: 1) when the trust of the
actor who might share the item is equal or higher than the sharing threshold
(Equation (1.3)), and; 2) when the trust of the actor who might share the item
is lower than the sharing threshold (Equation (1.4)).
decision_permit = φct ·wct(acp.ct) +φsl ·wsl(acp.sl) (1.3)
decision_deny = φct ·wct(acp.ct) +φsl ·wsl(acp.sl). (1.4)
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Contrarily to the Viewing algorithm, both Equations (1.3) and (1.4) have
only two components, i.e., the weight of the controllers types and the sensi-
tivity level of the associated controllers with respect to the item to be shared.
This is because the set of actors that can share an item already had privileges
to access it (viewers). This dierence directly impacts the structure of the
decision formula in such a way that the trust is used as a lter to know in ad-
vance if an actor is willing to share an item (there is no reason to include the
accessor’s weight as there are no accessors involved in the algorithm). As for
the rst two equations, we also introduce factors, two in this case: φct and
φsl (where eachφi ∈ [0,1]) representing the importance we give to each one
of the components of the formula. Concretely, φct aects the weight of the
controller types whereas φsl aects the sensitivity level of the item. Such
factors may be used in a ne grained manner to prioritize one component
over the other, in the same way as for the rst two equations.
As mentioned earlier, the set of viewers always includes the associated
controllers Ci . So, they are considered by the Sharing algorithm. As opposed
to the Viewing algorithm, where the associated controllers are always part
of the permitted actors to view the item, the Sharing algorithm treats the
associated controllers as any other viewer. Therefore, it is not guaranteed
that an associated controller can share an item unless the sharing policies
specied by the rest of the associated controllers permit it.
Example 2. The result of running Algorithm 1 in Example 1 was that David is
in the viewers set. We run the Sharing algorithm in order to determine whether
David can be a disseminator or not. The sharing policies of the associated con-
trollers are, SPp = {〈p,Alice,1〉,〈p,Bob,0.50〉, 〈p,Carol,0.25〉}. Remember
that in Example 1, Carol dened a trust value of 0.5 for David, and Alice dened
a trust value of 0.75 for David. We assume 0.25 is the returned value of the infer
function due to the indirect connection between Bob and David. In this scenario,
David fullls Carol’s sharing policy but he does not satisfy the minimum value
of trust set by Alice and Bob generating then a conict and executing the Sharing
algorithm. According to the associated controllers’ privacy policies, the value of
decision_permit is equal to 1.25 based on Equation (1.3). On the other hand,
the value of decision_deny is equal to 2.75 based on Equation (1.4), which
means the nal result is to deny David to share the post.
2.4 Computational Complexity
The algorithms presented here have linear time complexity. The Viewing
algorithm with respect to the size of the set of accessors (potential viewers),
and the Sharing algorithm with respect to the size of the input set of viewers.
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input : ACPi , TG, viewers and SPi
output: disseminators
permit_sharing, deny_sharing← filterActors(TG,SPi ,viewers)
foreach a ∈ viewers do
decision← 0
foreach acp ∈ ACPi do
if a ∈ permit_sharing then
decision← decision
+ φct ·wct(acp.ct) +φsl ·wsl(acp.sl)
end
else if a ∈ deny_sharing then
decision← decision
− φct ·wct(acp.ct) +φsl ·wsl(acp.sl)
end
end
if decision > 0 then
disseminators← disseminators∪ {a}
end
end
Algorithm 2: Sharing
In practice, these boundaries are never large enough to noticeably aect the
performance. We explain the complexity of both algorithms in more detail
below.
Algorithm 1 Let n be an upper bound in the number of input access control
policies and an upper boundm in the size of the set of accesors—i.e., the sum
of the sizes of the sets PER and DEN. The linear complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(n×m). This result trivially follows from the fact that, for each policy, it is
necessary to go through all the actors included in PER and DEN. Very often
the set of policies n is not very large [17] (it can thus be regarded as constant).
Therefore, the time complexity of the algorithm is linear with respect to m.
For a practical implementation, the main drawback of this result is that
the upper bound on the size of the sets PER and DEN might be large. In par-
ticular, actors with many friends, or who belong to vastly populated groups,
may include in their policy sets PER and DEN many actors. For instance,
some studies show that, on average, Facebook users have around 300 friends [32].
Therefore, optimizations that avoid checking all the actors in PER and DEN
can have a great impact in the performance of the algorithm.
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Algorithm 2 Given an upper bound j on the size of the viewers set, and an
upper bound k on the number of input sharing policies, the time complexity
of Algorithm 2 is O(j × k). Note that the number of sharing policies will
usually be small [17], therefore the algorithm has linear time complexity with
respect to k.
Though the set of viewers may be large, this algorithm allows for a simple
optimization which reduces its time complexity to constant. In many OSNs,
it is unnecessary to compute a priori the set of users that can share a post. It is
possible to execute the algorithm for a single actor on demand. For instance,
when the actor is about to view the item, the algorithm may be run for this
particular actor. As a consequence the factor j in the previous complexity is
reduced to a constant size of 1. Note that the algorithm is only executed the
rst time an actor views a post.
3 Evaluation
To evaluate how our proposed algorithms behave, we implemented our so-
lution in Python and executed it on a MacBook Air with 2.2 GHz Intel Core
i7 CPU and 8 Gb of RAM. We computed all possible combinations of trust,
sensitivity level and controller types for the Viewing algorithm as well as
the sensitivity level for Sharing algorithm of all the associated controllers:
owner, contributor, originator and stakeholders. It is important to recall that
there can be at most one contributor, one originator and zero or more stake-
holders where the owner is the only mandatory one. In the particular case of
the Viewing algorithm, each one of these associated controllers might have 5
possible trust values, 4 sensitivity levels and can dene 3 dierent accessors
types for the accessors whereas for the Sharing algorithm, the associated con-
trollers might only have 4 sensitivity levels dened. Additionally, each one
of the associated controllers may permit or deny the access or the sharing
action for an item.
We split the evaluation into two main parts corresponding to Viewing
and Sharing. We omit the factors in our evaluation as the objective is to
see the interplay of our components and not how the factors aects the
outcome.5 Additionally, and for the sake of simplicity, in what follows we
describe the evaluation of the cases where the distance between associated
controllers is 1 (see Table 1.2). Though the remaining cases are not explicitly
presented, they can be found in our implementation. All the source code of
our implementation are publicly accessible online [1].
5The factors may be considered as parameters that ne tune our decision algorithms, pro-
viding a range of decisions from more conservative to more liberal.
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Finally, as a consequence of the collaborative nature of our proposal, both
Viewing and Sharing algorithms generate a so-called ipping point. This
point represents the number of associated controllers who are needed in or-
der to revoke an action. For example, let assume that Alice (the owner of an
item) does not want Bob to access to the item, but other associated controllers
want to let him access to it. The question is then how many associated con-
trollers are needed in order to revoke Alice’s policy and let Bob access to the
item. We calculated that point for both algorithms as explained later in this
section assuming all involved factors to be 1.
Viewing. In all the gures related to Viewing, i.e., Figures 1.2 to 1.5, the root
node denotes the associated controllers for whom the experiment is running.
The rst level means the possible trust values. The second level symbolizes
the possible values for the sensitivity levels. The third level stands for the
accessor types possibilities whereas nally, the leaves represent the output
of the equation being executed according to the experiment.
Figure 1.2 shows all the outputs when there is only one associated con-
troller, either an owner or a stakeholder—both associated controllers gener-
ate the same values. For this experiment we created an access control policy
containing an arbitrary accessor when she is in the permitted set (P ER) of
the owner/stakeholder.
Similarly, we run the same experiment for the contributor/originator as
both generate the same values when the distance is 1, and the outputs can be
seen in Figure 1.3. As expected, the values are the same as in Figure 1.2 with a
dierence of -0.5—which is the only dierence between owners/stakeholder
and contributor/originator (see Table 1.2).
It is straightforward to compute the values for the same associated con-
trollers when the accessor is in the denied set. We generated all possible
values for Equation (1.2) and the results are shown in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 for
the owner/stakeholder and contributor/originator, respectively. From the re-
sults, it can be stated that when the owner/stakeholder denes the accessor in
the DEN set and the values of the trust, sensitivity level and the access type
are none, high and AN respectively, the decision value achieves its maximum
number (4.0) as expected and the similar behavior is seen for the contribu-
tor/originator achieving 3.5 as its maximum value under the same settings.
Finally, we included in Figures 1.7 and 1.8 corresponding to the combinations
where the contributor distance ≥2 and the viewer is in the PER and DEN
respectively.
As an example, let us suppose that in our collaborative OSN, there are two
associated controllers: an owner and an originator. The setting of the values
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Figure 1.2: Viewing: Decision values for the owner/stakeholder with (φct ,φat ,φtr ,φsl ) = 1
and the accessor ∈ PER
regarding the owner for a particular item and a given accessor who is in her
permitted set are: trust=highest; sensitivity_level=low; accessor_type=an.
On the other hand, the originator has the same accessor in the denied set
in such a way that there is a conict and her settings are: trust=none; sen-
sitivity_level=medium; access_type=gn. Finally, the output of Equation (1.1)
is 2.75 whereas the output of Equation (1.2) is 3.25. The nal decision is that
the accessor can access to the item (since 3.25− 2.75 > 0).
Sharing. In Figures 1.6a and 1.6b, the root node denotes the associated con-
trollers for whom the experiment is running. The rst level denotes the pos-
sible values for the sensitivity levels and the leaves represent the output of
Equations (1.3) and (1.4) respectively.
To evaluate how Equations (1.3) and (1.4) behave, we calculated all the
possible values that these equations can generate when the viewer is in either
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Figure 1.3: Viewing: Decision values for the contributor/originator with (φct , φat , φtr ,
φsl ) = 1; accessor ∈ PER; and distance=1
permit_sharing or deny_sharing sets generated by the external procedure
filterActors.
In particular, Figures 1.6a and 1.6b depict the decision values when the
viewer is in the permit_sharing for the owner/stakeholder (Figure 1.6a)
and for the contributor when the distance is equal to 1 (see Figure 1.6b).
As expected, the value of the leaves only dier on 0.5 (see Table 1.2). It is
worth mentioning that we have not included Figures when the viewer is in
the deny_sharing because in the Sharing algorithm they produce the same
ones. In 5, we run the same experiments and generated the same gures for
the rest of the cases, i.e., when the distance of the originator is greater than
2, and all the cases for the originator, i.e., when the infer function returns
either 0.25 or 0.5.
As an example, let us suppose that in our collaborative OSN, there are
two associated controllers: an owner and a contributor. The sensitivity level
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Figure 1.4: Viewing: Decision values for the owner/stakeholder with (φct ,φat ,φtr ,φsl ) = 1
and the accessor ∈DEN
regarding the owner for a particular item and a given viewer who is in her
permitted set is low. On the other hand, the contributor dened her sensi-
tivity level as medium and she has the same viewer in the denied set thus,
generating a conict. In both cases, the viewer fullls the sharing threshold
dened by the associated controllers. With these values, the output of Equa-
tion (1.3) is 1.25 whereas the output of Equation (1.4) is 1. The decision is
that the viewer can nally share the item, since 1.25− 1 > 0.
Flipping Point. We also computed the ipping point to determine how
many associated controllers are needed in order to revoke the decision taken
by another (set of) associated controller(s). Note that this is a combinato-
rial problem since there can exist a large number of stakeholders—the upper
bound is given by the number of actors in the OSN apart from the owner,
who can grant or deny privileges for the viewing or sharing actions to the
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Figure 1.5: Viewing: Decision values for the contributor/originator with (φct , φat , φtr ,
φsl ) = 1; accessor ∈DEN; and distance=1
actors. Hence, based on the experiments we carried out previously in this
section, we are providing a general way to compute such a ipping point.
We rst focus on the Viewing algorithm with one of the simplest scenar-
ios, i.e., the owner and a stakeholder who wants to revoke the owner’s deci-
sion. We computed the frequency of all the outputs (second row of Table 1.5)
in such a way that the maximum value for an owner with respect to a par-
ticular item is 4 and the frequency is 1 (as it only appears once in Figure 1.2).
The third row shows how many dierent ways a stakeholder might revoke
the initial decision, i.e., how many possible ways the stakeholder can get a
number greater than the output given in the second row. Finally, in the last
row, we computed the probability that an owner’s decision might be revoked
by one stakeholder. For example, when the owner achieves a 3.5 as output
of the formula (e.g., trust=highest; sensitivity_level=high; access_type=rn),
there is a 5% of probability that the stakeholder revokes her decision.
46
3. Evaluation
Owner
Stakeholder
highmedium
low none
2.01.5
1.25 1.0
(a) owner/stakeholder
Contributor
highmedium
low none
1.51.0
0.75 0.5
(b) contributor with distance=1
Figure 1.6: Sharing: Decision values with (φct ,φsl ) = 1 and viewer ∈ permit_sharing
Table 1.5: Viewing baseline probability of revoking the owner or a stakeholder’s initial de-
cision for only one stakeholder or the owner respectively
Viewing — Stakeholder
Output 4 3.75 3.5 3.25 3.0 2.75 2.5 2.25 2.0 1.75 1.5
Frequency 1 2 4 6 9 10 10 8 6 3 1
Revocation number 0 1 3 7 13 22 32 42 50 56 59
Baseline Probability 0% 1.6% 5% 11.6% 21.6% 36.6% 53.3% 70% 83.3% 93.3% 98.3%
Once we have that baseline probability, it is pretty straightforward to
compute such probability for any number of associated controllers. There
are two cases, when the accessor is either in the PER or in the DEN sets of
the associated controllers. The order matters when computing the baseline
probability, so we should rst generate the associated controllers who have
the intended accessor in their PER set and then in their DEN set. The rea-
son for this is that the PER set directly aects the output (row 1) and the
frequency (row 2), whereas the DEN set only aects the revocation number
(row 3).
On the one hand, if the accessor is in the PER set, the range of the out-
puts is computed by multiplying the max (4.0) and min (1.5) values by the
number of stakeholders plus the owner. Finally, both the frequency and the
revocation number should be recalculated to obtain the probability. As an
example, let us suppose that there are 3 stakeholders plus the owner who
grant a actor to access to an item. Then the range of the output will go from
6 to 16 by steps of 0.25. In this scenario, it is impossible for only one stake-
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Table 1.6: Viewing baseline probability of revoking the owner’s initial decision for one con-
tributor/originator when distance is 1
Viewing — Contributor/Originator
Output 4 3.75 3.5 3.25 3.0 2.75 2.5 2.25 2.0 1.75 1.5 1.25 1.0
Frequency 1 2 4 6 9 10 10 8 6 3 1 0 0
Revocation number 0 0 0 1 3 7 13 22 32 42 50 56 59
Baseline Probability 0% 0% 0% 1.6% 5% 11.6% 21.6% 36.6% 53.3% 70% 83.3% 0% 0%
Table 1.7: Sharing baseline probability of revoking the owner or a stakeholder’s initial deci-
sion for only one stakeholder or the owner respectively
Sharing — Stakeholder
Output 2.0 1.5 1.25 1.0
Frequency 1 1 1 1
Revocation number 0 1 2 3
Baseline Probability 0% 25% 50% 75%
holder to revoke the owner’s decision (note that the maximum value that a
stakeholder can achieve is 4).
On the other hand, if the accessor is in the DEN set, both the range of
the outputs and the frequency remain the same but the revocation number
must be recalculated by adding the number of dierent options by which the
stakeholder may get a number greater than the outputs.
We also computed the same baseline probability when there is an owner
and one contributor/originator when the distance is equal to 1. The results
can be seen in Table 1.6. The same strategy regarding the DEN and PER sets
explained above is also applied in this table. However, since our framework
can only have one contributor and one originator, the possibilities are sim-
plied to the combinations of 3 elements, i.e., if the accessor is in the P ER
or DEN sets of the owner, the contributor or the originator. In 5 we carried
the same experiment xing the distance ≥ 2 (see Table 1.11).
From the above results regarding the Viewing algorithm, we conclude
that whenever there are 5 associated controllers (remember that the owner
is mandatory), if 4 of them have a dierent opinion than the other one, the
decision will be denitely revoked no matter if that actor has a strong opinion
(sensitivity) about the item.
We carried out the same analysis for the Sharing algorithm. The results
can be seen in Table 1.7 for the stakeholder/owner, Table 1.8 for the contrib-
utor when the distance is 1, and Table 1.9 for an owner when her weight is
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Table 1.8: Sharing baseline probability of revoking the owner’s initial decision for one con-
tributor when distance is 1
Sharing — Contributor
Output 2 1.5 1.25 1.0 0.75 0.5
Frequency 1 1 1 1 0 0
Revocation number 0 0 1 1 2 3
Baseline Probability 0% 0% 25% 25% 0% 0%
Table 1.9: Sharing baseline probability of revoking the owner’s initial decision for one orig-
inator when her weight is 0.75
Sharing — Originator
Output 2 1.5 1.25 1.0 0.75
Frequency 1 1 1 1 0
Revocation number 0 1 1 2 3
Baseline Probability 0% 25% 25% 50% 0%
0.75. For completeness, we included in 5 the baseline probability computation
when the contributor’s distance is ≥ 2 (Table 1.12) and when the originator’s
weight is 0.25 (see Table 1.13).
It is interesting to see in this case that if an owner achieves the maximum
value (2), then in the best case scenario, a stakeholder plus one more asso-
ciated controllers are needed to revoke the owner’s decision. On the other
hand, in the worst case scenario (i.e., all associated controllers achieve the
minimum amount in the decision) two stakeholders would be needed to re-
voke the owner’s decision. Finally, while contributors and originators are the
less powerful associated controllers in such a way that they can only achieve
a 1.5 in the best case scenario, they can be crucial when there only are a few
stakeholders involved in the sharing decision.
3.1 Proof-Of-Concept Implementation
Diaspora belongs to the family of decentralized OSNs. In such OSNs there is
no single entity where all information is stored. Instead, they consist of inde-
pendent nodes which host all the information of the social network. Diaspora
nodes are called pods. A pod is basically a server which host an instance of
Diaspora’s source code and its own database.
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Table 1.10: Comparison between Facebook, Diaspora, CAC Framework and our Diaspora
implementation.
Components Facebook Diaspora CAC Framework Proof-of-Concept
Controllers Types owner owner owner, stakeholder, contributor, originator owner, stakeholder
Acessors Types rn, gn, an rn rn, gn, an rn
Sensitivity Levels ∅ ∅ none, low, medium, high none, low, medium, high
Trust ∅ ∅ none, low, medium, high, highest none, low, medium, high, highest
We deployed a particular instance of our approach in Diaspora [1]. Since
our main goal is to demonstrate that our approach can be deployed in a real
world application, and for the sake of simplicity, we did not use the decen-
tralized architecture that Diaspora provides. Instead, we deployed our own
pod on a MacBook Pro with 2.9 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU and 8 Gb of RAM.
Table 1.10 depicts the dierences between Facebook, Diaspora, our the-
oretical model (framework), and our proof-of-concept implementation. We
comparison criteria are with respect to what can be expressed in each one
of them (and what was implemented). As expected, our framework is more
general than Facebook and Diaspora since it considers all the controller and
accessors types, and it allows for a more ne-grained decision concerning
permitting/denying access to view/share an item.
Since our framework is more general, Facebook’s privacy settings may
be modelled in our framework. This is done by giving suitable values to
the factors of our algorithms: assign 0 to the factors of accessor type (φat),
sensitivity level (φsl ) and trust (φtr ), and set the weight of all the associated
controllers to 0, except for the owner whose weight is 1.
Diaspora does not allow to dene sensitivity levels with respect to an
item, nor trust between users, we extended Diaspora in order to include such
notions. Due to the way Diaspora is implemented, our proof-of-concept im-
plementation only includes the owner and stakeholder controllers types and
accessor type rn. Implementing contributor and originator controller types
is not possible because Diaspora does not provide the feature of posting in
someone else’s prole. Moreover, the accessor types gn and an are not per-
formed due to other Diaspora constraints: 1) no distinction between rela-
tionships and groups, and; 2) social activities such as posting, sharing, etc.,
are dened over relationships.
Usability. In our implementation we provide a natural and user-friendly
way to dene privacy settings, having default values that favour the privacy
of the users—5 shows the dierent interfaces of our implementation. More-
over, our privacy setting interface allows ne-grained control for both data
and accessors as well as it allows to dene both the permitted and denied set
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of accessors either by using the dened relationships, called "aspects" in Di-
aspora, such as “family” or “friends”, or even more general relationships such
as “Everyone” or “Nobody” (see Figure 1.11). The associated controllers can
also determine the sensitivity level of shared items based on their contents
as well as the trust level of each relationship and the trust level for users who
do not belong to any relationship (see Figure 1.12).
Our pod allows the associated controllers to specify their privacy settings
regarding the sharing action (see Figure 1.12). Not all the associated con-
trollers and accessors who have privileges to view the post have the rights
to share it. Consequently, in our pod the share button only appears to as-
sociated controllers and viewers who have the right to disseminate the post
according to a cooperative decision obtained by executing Algorithm 2.
We adapted, by modifying the controller and the accessor types, Exam-
ples 1 and 2 to work in Diaspora. As expected, in Example 1, David was able
to view the Alice’s post whereas in Example 2, he cannot share it. Besides,
we also adapted, by having rn as accesor type, all the experiments presented
in the paper, and achieved the same outputs as in Figures 1.2, 1.4 and 1.6a,
where the owner and a stakeholder are involved.
4 Related Work
In access control models for OSNs, we can distinguish between two main
approaches: 1) mechanisms which assume that the information is governed
by a single user, e.g., [5, 11, 15], and; 2) mechanisms where a collaborative
decision regarding the information is made, e.g., [17, 18, 23, 26, 27, 28, 35].
In the following we only focus on the second approach and we analyze the
most relevant proposals published on this topic.
Squicciarini et al. [26, 27] provide a novel collective privacy mechanism
for content sharing among users in OSNs. The paper considers that the pri-
vacy control of the shared content is co-owned by multiple users, so each
stakeholder may separately specify her own privacy settings for the shared
data and thus, a voting algorithm to enable collective enforcement for shared
data is used. However, in their algorithm only the winners of the voting al-
gorithm control who can access the data, instead of harmonizing all stake-
holders’ privacy preferences.
Carminati and Ferrari [3] introduce a collaborative access control mech-
anism in OSNs that integrates the topology of social networks in policy-
making. They improve topology-based access control taking into account
a set of collaborative users by giving a new class of security policies, called
collaborative security policies, which indicate the set of users who should
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contribute to the collaboration. In contrast, our work proposes a formal col-
laborative model to manage viewing and sharing of shared items in OSNs, in
addition to ne-grained policy specication scheme.
Similarly, Such and Criado [28] propose a mechanism to resolve multi-
party conicts based on the willingness of each associated controller to give
access. However, once again, in this work there is no collaborative decision
given that if one user has high willingness and another one low willingness,
only the former will determine the nal access.
Another proposal of a policy-based approach to control access to shared
data in OSNs is given in [34]. In this case, the owner of the content is allowed
to specify policies for the content she uploads and other users (called trusted
co-owners, who previously must be invited by the owner) can edit such a
policy. In our proposal we use the same concept in the sense that the owner
has to mention users (stakeholders) to be part of the collaborative decision.
However, stakeholders in our work do not directly edit the owners policy,
and instead we consider their access policies to calculate the decision.
Xu et al. [35] propose a collaborative privacy management mechanism
where the collective decision is made by the user who wants to post data
(the owner, who is responsible for gathering feedback from other involved
users). Though trust values are used to indicate how much inuence a user’s
opinion will have on the aggregated decision, the owner has full decision
power on who should access the item.
The approach proposed by Xu et al. [16] is similar to our work in the sense
that it oers a systematic solution for detecting and resolving privacy con-
icts for collaborative data sharing in OSNs. However, their approach needs
a negotiation mechanism to solve the privacy policies conicts before the ac-
cess privileges are computed. In order to x that issue, they improved their
work by enhancing a policy specication scheme and a voting-based con-
ict resolution mechanism [17]. Nevertheless, the conict resolution strat-
egy presented in such work is selected by the data owner which leads to a
unilateral decision, i.e., without considering the privacy preferences of other
associated controllers involved. Our work could be seen as an extension as
the one presented in [17]: all the associated controllers are taken into con-
sideration for the collaborative decision, so we are indeed giving a truly col-
laborative access control framework.
Based on the multiparty access control model presented in [17], Vish-
wamitra et al. [33] introduced a model that allows each involved user in a
photo to independently decide whether some personally identiable infor-
mation in the photo is shown or blurred. In our scenario, the collaborative de-
cision protects all the items, including photos, from being viewed or shared.
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5. Conclusion
Controlling the content of the item is outside the scope of this article.
Gay et al. [13] provided ne-grained privacy mechanism to control over
sharing and re-sharing, and the distribution of re-shared messages in decen-
tralized OSN. Similar to our work, they also base their enforcement of privacy
policies on ReBAC. Despite this apparent similarity, our access control policy
has more ne-grained features such as the possibility to dene an explicit de-
nied set and accessor specication policies. In their work, only trust is used
to determine which users, among those who has already received the item,
are allowed to propagate this item. In contrast, we apply trust as one of four
components in the process of computing the collaborative decision regard-
ing who can view or share a given item. That is, contrary to our approach,
the proposal in [13] doses not consider the users associated with the item as
co-controllers.
See [22, 24, 25] for a survey on state-of-the-art collaborative access con-
trol systems for OSN.
5 Conclusion
We presented a collaborative access control framework for OSNs that collec-
tively achieves a decision about who should (not) access, or (not) share, an
item. The decision is based on the privacy settings of all concerned associ-
ated controllers, i.e., owner, originator, contributor and stakeholder(s). This
is done by taking into account the following four aspects: trust relationship
between users, sensitivity level of the users with respect to the concerned
item as well as dierent weights for both the controller types and accessor
types. We proposed a Viewing and a Sharing algorithm for taking such a
decision about the items. We also evaluated them by generating all combi-
nations of the components, and provided a proof-of-concept implementation
in the open source social network Diaspora.
Concerning the correctness of our solution, dierent decisions could have
been taken depending on whether one might want to privilege privacy over
utility or vice-versa. This trade-o between privacy and utility may be stretched
or relaxed by playing with the factors we have dened, and that are assigned
to each one of the components associated with the dierent privacy setting
aspects upon which our decision algorithms are based on. We plan to study
and experiment with those factors in future work.
53

Bibliography
[1] H. Alshareef, R. Pardo, G. Schneider, and P. Picazo. A Collaborative
Access Control Framework for Online Social Networks, Feb. 2019.
[2] K. Carley. A theory of group stability. American sociological review,
pages 331–354, 1991.
[3] B. Carminati and E. Ferrari. Collaborative access control in on-line so-
cial networks. In CollaborateCom, pages 231–240, 2011.
[4] J. Caverlee, L. Liu, and S. Webb. Socialtrust: tamper-resilient trust es-
tablishment in online communities. In JCDL, pages 104–114, 2008.
[5] Y. Cheng, J. Park, and R. Sandhu. Relationship-based access control for
online social networks: Beyond user-to-user relationships. In PASSAT,
pages 646–655. IEEE, 2012.
[6] S. De Capitani Di Vimercati, S. Foresti, P. Samarati, and S. Jajodia. Ac-
cess control policies and languages. International Journal of Computa-
tional Science and Engineering, 3(2):94–102, 2007.
[7] S. D. C. di Vimercati, P. Samarati, and S. Jajodia. Policies, models, and
languages for access control. In DNIS, pages 225–237, 2005.
[8] Diaspora. Diaspora. https://joindiaspora.com, 2016. [Available
Online].
[9] S. L. Feld. The focused organization of social ties. American journal of
sociology, 86(5):1015–1035, 1981.
[10] P. W. Fong, M. Anwar, and Z. Zhao. A privacy preservation model
for facebook-style social network systems. In ESORICS, pages 303–320,
2009.
[11] P. W. Fong and I. Siahaan. Relationship-based access control policies
and their policy languages. In SACMAT, pages 51–60, 2011.
55
Bibliography
[12] C. Gates. Access control requirements for web 2.0 security and privacy.
IEEE Web, 2(0), 2007.
[13] R. Gay, J. Hu, H. Mantel, and S. Mazaheri. Relationship-based access
control for resharing in decentralized online social networks. In FPS,
pages 18–34, 2017.
[14] J. A. Golbeck. Computing and applying trust in web-based social net-
works. PhD thesis, 2005.
[15] J. Grossklags, N. Christin, and J. Chuang. Secure or insure?: a game-
theoretic analysis of information security games. In WWW, pages 209–
218, 2008.
[16] H. Hu, G.-J. Ahn, and J. Jorgensen. Detecting and resolving privacy
conicts for collaborative data sharing in online social networks. In
ACSAC, pages 103–112, 2011.
[17] H. Hu, G.-J. Ahn, and J. Jorgensen. Multiparty access control for online
social networks: model and mechanisms. IEEE Transactions on Knowl-
edge and Data Engineering, 25(7):1614–1627, 2013.
[18] P. Ilia, B. Carminati, E. Ferrari, P. Fragopoulou, and S. Ioannidis. Sam-
pac: socially-aware collaborative multi-party access control. In CO-
DASPY, pages 71–82, 2017.
[19] A. Jøsang, R. Ismail, and C. Boyd. A survey of trust and reputation sys-
tems for online service provision. Decision support systems, 43(2):618–
644, 2007.
[20] U. Kuter and J. Golbeck. Sunny: A new algorithm for trust inference
in social networks using probabilistic condence models. In AAAI, vol-
ume 7, pages 1377–1382, 2007.
[21] M. Lesani and S. Bagheri. Applying and inferring fuzzy trust in semantic
web social networks. In Canadian Semantic Web, pages 23–43, 2006.
[22] F. Paci, A. Squicciarini, and N. Zannone. Survey on access control for
community-centered collaborative systems. ACM Computing Surveys
(CSUR), 51(1):6:1–6:38, Jan. 2018.
[23] S. Rajtmajer, A. Squicciarini, C. Grin, S. Karumanchi, and A. Tyagi.
Constrained social-energy minimization for multi-party sharing in on-
line social networks. In AAMAS, pages 680–688, 2016.
56
Bibliography
[24] W. Sherchan, S. Nepal, and C. Paris. A survey of trust in social networks.
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 45(4):47, 2013.
[25] A. Squicciarini, S. Rajtmajer, and N. Zannone. Multi-party access con-
trol: Requirements, state of the art and open challenges. In SACMAT, 6
2018.
[26] A. C. Squicciarini, M. Shehab, and F. Paci. Collective privacy manage-
ment in social networks. In WWW, pages 521–530, 2009.
[27] A. C. Squicciarini, M. Shehab, and J. Wede. Privacy policies for shared
content in social network sites. The VLDB Journal, 19(6):777–796, 2010.
[28] J. M. Such and N. Criado. Resolving multi-party privacy conicts in
social media. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering,
28(7):1851–1863, 2016.
[29] J. M. Such and N. Criado. Multiparty privacy in social media. Commun.
ACM, 61(8):74–81, 2018.
[30] J. M. Such, J. Porter, S. Preibusch, and A. N. Joinson. Photo privacy
conicts in social media: A large-scale empirical study. In CHI, pages
3821–3832, 2017.
[31] K. Thomas, C. Grier, and D. M. Nicol. unfriendly: Multi-party privacy
risks in social networks. In PETS, pages 236–252, 2010.
[32] J. Ugander, B. Karrer, L. Backstrom, and C. Marlow. The anatomy of the
facebook social graph. CoRR, abs/1111.4503, 2011.
[33] N. Vishwamitra, Y. Li, K. Wang, H. Hu, K. Caine, and G.-J. Ahn. Towards
pii-based multiparty access control for photo sharing in online social
networks. In SACMAT, pages 155–166, 2017.
[34] R. Wishart, D. Corapi, S. Marinovic, and M. Sloman. Collaborative pri-
vacy policy authoring in a social networking context. In POLICY, pages
1–8, 2010.
[35] L. Xu, C. Jiang, N. He, Z. Han, and A. Benslimane. Trust-based collab-
orative privacy management in online social networks. Forensics and
Security, 2018.
57

Appendix
Appendix A
For completeness, we included the results of the experiments presented in
Section 3 for the remaining cases in the Viewing algorithm, that is, when the
originator/contributor are not directly connected to the owner, i.e., distance
≥2, and the viewer is in the P ER set (see Figure 1.7) and when she is not (see
Figure 1.8).
Regarding the Sharing algorithm, we generated the combinations for a
contributor when the distance ≥2 and the viewer is in the permit_sharing
set (see Figure 1.9). Additionally, we run the experiments for the originator
when the viewer is in the permit_sharing set. We generated two gures
according to the trust level, i.e., when the TG.infer (originator,owner) returns
0.25 (see Figure 1.10a) and when it returns 0.75 (see Figure 1.10b).
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Figure 1.7: Viewing: Decision values for the contributor/originator with (φct , φat , φtr ,
φsl ) = 1; accessor ∈ PER; and distance≥2
Appendix B
Table 1.11: Viewing baseline probability of revoking the owner’s initial decision for one
contributor/originator when distance is ≥ 2
Viewing — Contributor/Originator
Output 4 3.75 3.5 3.25 3.0 2.75 2.5 2.25 2.0 1.75 1.5 1.25 1.0 0.75
Frequency 1 2 4 6 9 10 10 8 6 3 1 0 0 0
Revocation number 0 0 0 0 1 3 7 13 22 32 42 50 56 59
Baseline Probability 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.6% 5% 11.6% 21.6% 36.6% 53.3% 70% 0% 0% 0%
We executed the experiments in order to compute all the baseline proba-
bilities for the Viewing algorithm when the distance of both the contributor
and the originator is ≥2 (see Table 1.11).
For the Sharing algorithm, we included tables corresponding to the con-
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Figure 1.8: Viewing: Decision values for the contributor/originator with (φct , φat , φtr ,
φsl ) = 1; accessor ∈DEN; and distance ≥2
tributor when the distance ≥2 (see Table 1.12) and to the originator when the
weight is 0.25 (see Table 1.13).
Table 1.12: Sharing baseline probability of revoking the owner’s initial decision for one con-
tributor when distance ≥ 2
Sharing — Contributor
Output 2 1.5 1.25 1.0 0.75 0.5
Frequency 1 1 1 1 0 0
Revocation number 0 0 0 1 2 3
Baseline Probability 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0%
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Figure 1.9: Sharing: Decision values for the contributor with (φct ,φsl ) = 1; viewer ∈
permit_sharing; and distance ≥ 2
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Figure 1.10: Sharing: Decision values for the originator with (φct ,φsl ) = 1; viewer ∈
permit_sharing
Appendix C
Here we show dierent screenshots of the UI of the collaborative access con-
trol prototype that we implemented in Diaspora. In Figure 1.11, associated
controllers can specify their privacy preferences regarding who—accessors—
are allowed to access the item and who are not. Figure 1.12 shows the set-
tings of the sensitivity level, trust level and sharing policy that associated
controllers can assign.
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Table 1.13: Sharing baseline probability of revoking the owner’s initial decision for one orig-
inator when her weight is 0.25
Sharing — Originator
Output 2 1.5 1.25 1.0 0.75 0.5 0.25
Frequency 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Revocation number 0 0 0 1 1 2 3
Baseline Probability 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0%
Figure 1.11: User interface to specify allowed and disallowed users
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Figure 1.12: User interface to assign sensitivity levels to types of items and trust levels on
other users
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